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Abstract:   
Despite high growth rates in recent decades, Burkina Faso is still a poor country. The 
government acknowledges the need for a stronger commitment to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), particularly regarding the reduction of poverty. At the same 
time, the Burkinabe budget deficit has grown in recent years in response to various 
crises which have hit the country. There are strong pressures to rapidly reduce this 
budget deficit, but there are active concerns about how this will be achieved. The 
country thus faces difficult choices: how to ensure better living conditions for children, 
attain the millennium goals and ensure they have a better future in the present 
budgetary context? 
To answer this question, three policy interventions were identified: (i) an increase in 
education spending, (ii) a school fees subsidy and (iii) a cash transfer to households with 
children under the age of five. The same total amount is injected into the economy in 
each of the three cases, facilitating comparison between the three scenarios. The 
discussions also made it possible to identify the three financing mechanisms that appear 
most realistic: (i) a reduction in subsidies, (ii) an increase in the indirect tax collection 
rate and (iii) an extension of the timeframe to reduce the public deficit to ten years rather 
than five. 
The results indicate that increased public education spending helps raise school 
participation and pass rates, thus increasing the supply and education level of skilled 
workers, leading to a reduced incidence and depth of both monetary and caloric poverty. 
School fees subsidies have more differentiated effects on education: they promote 
children’s entry into school to a greater degree, but are less effective at inducing them to 
pursue their studies. Finally, the supply of skilled workers increases slightly, but their 
average level of education is lower than in the reference scenario. This type of 
intervention has a beneficial impact on poverty, greater than under increased public 
education spending. 
Cash transfers have a limited impact on educational behaviour, and thus on the supply 
of skilled workers, but substantially reduce the incidence and depth of poverty. 
The results are qualitatively similar under each financing approach. In sum, if the 
objective is to achieve improved education and economic performance, the best 
intervention appears to be to focus on increased public education spending. However, if 
reducing child poverty is prioritized, it is cash transfers to families that appear more 
suitable. Regardless of the intervention considered, the most suitable financing 
mechanism appears to be a temporary increase in the public deficit, because it is 
accompanied by a smaller negative effect on the quality of life of the most destitute. 
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1. Introduction 
Burkina Faso has experienced consistently high economic growth over the last two decades. 
Between 2000 and 2008, the annual average growth rate was in the range of 5%. Since 2000, 
this growth has become more regular and has fluctuated less, thanks to macroeconomic stability 
and improved management of public finances, but has been strongly tempered by annual 
population growth of 3.1% over 1996-2006 (MEF (2010)). Per capita GDP grew by an annual 
average of around 2.4% over 2000-2008. Despite relatively solid economic performance, Burkina 
Faso remains a poor country, and is very far behind in terms of infrastructure and human 
development. Rural areas, where the majority of the poor and vulnerable reside (52.3% of the 
rural population is poor, as opposed to 20% in urban areas, INSD 2003), continue to lag urban 
areas in terms of development due to structural weaknesses following external shocks and 
unequal access to public and private services. 
The government recognizes the need for a stronger commitment to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), particularly to reduce poverty by 2015. Since the beginning of the 
2000s, Burkina Faso has made commendable efforts to promote development and to reduce 
poverty by developing a strategic framework for the fight against poverty (CSLP). However, the 
results of implementing the CLSP over 2000-2003 indicate that the related activities were 
undermined by the weakness of sectoral policies and insufficient budget allocations.2 
To remedy these situations, the CSLP was revised in 2003 and includes four strategic axes with 
specific objectives and action areas that have been developed into Priority Action Plans (PAPs). 
Compared to the 2000 CSLP, the revised CSLP introduced innovations, such as including the 
“social protection of the poor” as an action area, addressing the MDGs and expanding priority 
sectors. These priority sectors most notably concern education, health, drinking water, rural 
development (including food security), the fight against HIV/AIDS and social protection. 
The second generation CSLP thus allowed the Burkinabe government to provide itself with a 
new point of reference for development: the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable 
Development (SCADD), for 2011-2015. The principal axes of the SCADD are: (i) improvement of 
macroeconomic stability; (ii) acceleration of economic changes in rural areas through promotion 
of land reform, production of cotton, microfinance and the creation of informal employment; 
(iii) development of human capital by expanding the coverage of the first level of education, 
access to health services and the fight against demographic growth; and (iv) improved 
governance by supporting more efficient and transparent use of public resources. 
Moreover, the national workshop on social protection in 2010 proposed the development of a 
national social protection policy; this policy was finalized in January 2012 and incorporated into 
the new SCADD. The goal is to fill in the gaps of isolated and small-scale social programs, which 
are not subjected to any monitoring. 
Thus, in order to lay the foundations of growth and sustainable development as per the SCADD, 
the government would need to invest more in social sectors which significantly accelerate 
economic development. Child poverty is a huge social and economic loss because it has long 
term (and often irreversible) effects on individuals and their future children. In other words, 
poverty can be transmitted from one generation to the next. The intergenerational effects are 
not limited to the child itself: they also significantly reduce economic growth. For example, child 
malnutrition brings major costs in terms of the acquisition of basic knowledge and production as 
                                                          
2 Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), 2010. 
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an adult; this has an important impact on national economic growth. Public social spending has 
an undeniable impact on child wellbeing, in the long run contributing to the economic growth of 
a nation. However, governments do not always have suitable tools to allow them to set 
priorities among sectors and to make important choices concerning allocations of their limited 
budget between a large number of programs. To do this, they must evaluate how each area of 
spending differently influences the wellbeing of the population and economic growth in the long 
run. Moreover, in order to develop a credible plan for current spending and investment, the 
financing strategy of these programs is an integral part of an in-depth analysis. 
The Burkinabe budget deficit has grown in recent years in response to a number of crises which 
hit the country in 2009 and 2010. Pressures to rapidly reduce budget deficits are strong, but 
there are active concerns about how this will be achieved. In effect, eliminating (or reducing) 
public spending that is largely focused on children may have consequences on their current level 
of wellbeing, on attainment of the MDGs, and thus on the economy of Burkina Faso in the 
longer term. The country thus finds itself faced with difficult choices: how will it ensure 
improved living conditions for children, attain the millennium goals and ensure a better future in 
such a budgetary context? 
It is in this context that governments are called upon to establish priorities among the different 
requests for funding, all the while under their own financial and fiscal constraints. Establishing 
these priorities will require them to evaluate how each area of spending differently affects long 
term development. 
Moreover, the sustainability and impacts of public spending on different programs certainly 
depend on the financing mechanism(s) put into place. Governments should therefore be able to 
simulate the impacts of the alternatives available to them. 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the impacts of public policies on the rates of poverty, school 
participation and economic growth in Burkina Faso. Particular attention is paid to policies 
benefitting children. Given the budget constraints mentioned above, the policy reforms 
analyzed in this study are paired with each of a number of different financing mechanisms. Both 
the proposed public policies and the financing scenarios were developed following discussion 
with the local committee. 
This paper presents the results of three different scenarios which increase public spending on 
children, in each case financed by one of three financing mechanisms. The first scenario is an 
increase in government education current spending. The second scenario is an education price 
subsidy. The third scenario deals with a cash transfer to households with a child aged 0-5. Each 
of these scenarios is financed either by a decrease in production subsidies, a higher tax 
collection rate, or by extending the timeframe to reduce the deficit to GDP ratio. The scenarios 
are comparable because they involve a similar increase in the budget. 
The next section consists of an analysis of the poverty and the types of vulnerability and risks 
affecting children, in addition to a brief review of the existing social protection framework in 
Burkina Faso. This is followed by two sections, which respectively present a literature review 
and the methodology used. The simulation results are then covered before we conclude. 
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2. Analysis of the situation of children in Burkina Faso 
Children account for 53% of the population of Burkina Faso, 81% of which live in rural areas 
(INSD, 2009). They suffer from or are exposed to relatively precarious living conditions. 
2.1. Child monetary poverty 
In Burkina Faso, children are more vulnerable than adults and are thus more susceptible to living 
in poverty. This fact is shown for the first time in Batana et al. (2012), who reveal that children 
are 20 percent more likely than adults to live in poverty. 
In addition to vulnerabilities associated with social conditions, there are also vulnerabilities 
linked to economic shocks and natural disasters which affect children directly or indirectly via 
household survival strategies. For example, the 2009 and 2010 floods, which had major impacts 
on the Centre and Boucle de Mouhon regions, affected child poverty through loss of housing 
and stoppages in schooling, all the while exposing them to illness (cholera, diarrhoeal disease, 
malaria) and displacements. Also, food commodity price increases in 2008 led families to reduce 
their consumption and to look for new adaptation strategies such as the emigration of children 
or recourse to child labour. The effect of these various factors and external shocks on children 
must be accounted for in order to implement an effective response. 
2.2. Child education 
Major progress has been accomplished in child education since 2000, particularly with respect 
to the supply of and access to universal primary education; the gross enrollment ratio in primary 
school went from 40% in 2000 to 74.8% in 2009, and the number of registered students doubled 
to 2 million.3 However, the recent rapid increases in the number of registered students, 
following the elimination of school fees for primary education, may actually constitute a 
significant challenge with respect to education quality. Rapid population growth also puts 
pressures on the system’s capacity. In effect, average per capita public spending has not 
stopped falling since 2003 and student-teacher ratios have barely budged,4 while the gap 
between the total number of school-aged children and the number registered in school has 
gradually declined. 
2.3. Child health 
Illness is a factor which may intensify vulnerability by limiting the productive capacities of the 
patient and by diverting a share of household resources towards health care. 
In Burkina Faso, a large share of individuals is excluded from health care, particularly in rural 
areas. Major improvements have nevertheless been achieved: the child vaccination objectives 
were largely exceeded and the number of health centres and personnel have both increased 
rapidly. 
Despite significant progress in the coverage of health, with a reduction in the average distance 
to reach a Health and Social Promotion Centre (CSPS), more than one in six children dies before 
                                                          
3 If we look at net education rates, we see that one in two children of age to enter the first level of 
schooling has not yet done so. 
4 World Bank (2009). 
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the age of five in Burkina Faso – 342 deaths per day – and more than one-third also suffer from 
delayed height and weight growth. The rates of infant and child mortality were respectively 
81‰ and 184‰ in 2003, and in 2010 were 65‰ and 129‰ (INSD et al. 2004, 2011). 
Important regional disparities persist in relation to the coverage of health infrastructure. In 
effect, even though the national average distance went from 9.1 km in 2002 to 7.6 km in 2008, 
we still observe certain districts with an average distance of more than 18 km in 2007 (Ministry 
of Health, 2008). 
In terms of nutrition, stunting among children declined from 43.1% of children under the age of 
five in 2003 to 35.1% in 2009, with more noteworthy progress in rural areas. Moreover, 
important progress was accomplished to reduce wasting among children, with the share falling 
by nearly half, although the level still remains above the “severe” standard according to the 
WHO norm. Important progress has also been accomplished in terms of reducing chronic child 
malnutrition. A strategic plan covering 2010-2015 was adopted in order to reduce hunger and 
illness linked to nutritional deficiency diseases. 
2.4. Social protection in Burkina Faso 
Up to the end of 2011, Burkina Faso did not have a national social protection policy – this policy 
is now finalized. Aside from reduced costs for the use social services, there is no institutionalized 
program of social transfers in Burkina Faso, i.e., there are no direct transfers from the state to 
households to support their consumption. There are, however, small-scale transfer programs 
such as the cash transfers in the Nahouri province that targeted 8 000 children in its pilot phase 
over 2008-2010. The provisional results of this program show that cash transfers have a 
significant positive effect on child health and education indicators. 
A suitable social protection framework is needed to deal with all sorts of vulnerabilities faced by 
children and their households. However, the midterm review of the CSLP in October 2008 
concluded that the strategy did not include a social protection policy for the poorest. As a result, 
a key decision was made in 2010, following the national workshop on social protection, to 
develop a national social protection policy and to incorporate it into the new SCADD. Moreover, 
following the study by Balma et al. (2010) on the effects of the economic crisis and their 
simulations in terms of social policy, a social protection component was introduced to the 
national action plan in order to face this crisis. This helps improve the development of policy in 
Burkina Faso for better coordination between economic and social policies. 
2.4.1. Social protection and education 
In terms of social protection in the education sector, the law on free  for primary education is 
very important to ensure that the poorest can access to education system. However, its 
implementation remains unequal. As a result, many children do not go to school. A comparative 
analysis of the impact of eliminating school fees should be carried out. The supply of free kits 
and textbooks to all students is an important policy to improve access to and the quality of 
education. The current school canteen program has debatable impacts, given that their effective 
coverage and the costs incurred by the communities vary considerably and/or are completely 
unknown. Overall, a recent study on the effectiveness of free education in Burkina Faso showed 
that one on five parents still pays school fees, three in five parents pays for school canteens, and 
nearly one in five students did not receive free school textbooks for the 2010-2011 school year.5 
                                                          
5 CN-EPT BF, 2011. 
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2.4.2. Social protection, health and nutrition 
The main areas of progress for health and social protection concern exemptions for certain 
services and subsidies for emergency obstetric and neonatal care (SONU). In principal, these 
programs are national in coverage and cost the state more than 535 million CFA per year. In 
practice, their actual implementation is not ensured and many among the population are not 
informed of these benefits they have rights to (Ridde and Bicaba, 2009). 
Many programs exist to promote food security on the supply side, including sale at “social 
prices” and free distribution of foodstuffs. A new program to distribute food vouchers in the 
cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso is also in place, financed by the World Food Program 
WFP). This program focuses on household demand by increasing their purchasing power. 
However, the preliminary results show that, even though 30 000 households have benefitted 
from this program over the last year, the anticipated effects remain mixed: an examination of 
the outcomes by the IMF shows that the 2008 subsidies for food products largely benefitted the 
richest in the population, an analysis that has been updated for the for the rice price subsidy in 
2010.6 
3. Literature review 
The adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) implies a need for more detailed study of the impacts of public policies and social 
reforms. Numerous studies evaluate the consequences of fiscal reforms and public spending on 
vulnerable populations (poor households, orphans and other vulnerable children, etc.). This 
section presents an overview of the literature pursuing this objective and different approaches 
used, allowing us to effectively situate the scientific contribution of the present study. 
Child wellbeing is affected by fiscal and budgetary policies, notably by providing them with 
public services such as health and education, and by improving the household economy 
(Waddington, 2004). The pioneering studies in the analysis of the impacts of fiscal reforms on 
wellbeing use benefit incidence analysis and marginal benefit incidence analysis for the benefits 
associated with product tax reforms, as done by Ahmad and Stern (1984). This last approach has 
seen numerous applications, including contributions from Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990), Yitzhaki 
and Slemrod (1991), Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996), Ray (1997) and Makdissi and Wodon (2002). 
Bibi and Duclos (2004) extend the preceding approach in order to identify the direction of fiscal 
reforms when the objective is to reduce poverty. Their approach, illustrated with Tunisian data, 
consists of deriving the cost-benefit ratio of an increase in a consumption tax by minimizing a 
poverty indicator. 
Recent fiscal reforms in Africa following trade liberalization have rekindled interest for analysis 
of the impacts of fiscal reform on social welfare (Sahn and Younger, 2003; Chen, Matovu and 
Reinnika, 2001; Rajemison and Younger, 2000; Alderman and del Ninno, 1999). Moreover, these 
analyses prove to be particularly interesting because they can be used for analysis of fiscal 
changes induced by new policy regimes, as well as their impacts on the most vulnerable 
populations. Benefit incidence analysis has the advantage of requiring little data, making it 
relatively easy to carry out (Ray, 1997, p.367). This is particularly suitable for developing 
countries where little data is available. 
                                                          
6 IMF Staff Report. July 2010. 
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However, this approach is limited to measuring the direct effect of the fiscal reform: it 
determines whether the reform is progressive or regressive. It thus ignores the effect that the 
reform may have on individuals or their potential response. 
Some authors (Glewwe, 1991; Gertler and Van Der Gaag, 1990,), aiming to address the 
shortcomings of this approach, are interested in econometric estimations of the impact of fiscal 
policies on wellbeing by controlling for other variables which may influence the estimations. 
The two preceding approaches (marginal incidence and econometric analysis) are partial 
equilibrium analyses, and thus do not capture the feedback effects induced by other sectors or 
actors in the economy (a policy to increase public education spending could have indirect effects 
on the agricultural sector, for example). These effects need to be considered because public 
policies have indirect effects on the economy as a whole. 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are the most comprehensive tool to study the 
impacts of public policies on different agents in the economy. Many studies use this tool to 
analyze the impact of public policies (trade liberalization, fiscal reforms, increased public 
spending) in developing countries. In order to capture intrahousehold differences, these studies 
combine a macro component with a microeconomic model (Decaluwé et al., 1999; Cogneau and 
Robillard, 2001 and 2004; Cockburn, 2006; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Boccanfuso et al., 2003). 
To our knowledge, application of these tools to Burkina Faso is sparse. Gottschalk et al. (2009) 
use the MAMS model to create fiscal space and to analyze the impact of creating this fiscal 
space on the MDGs. They identify three mechanisms to create fiscal space: establish priorities in 
public spending, increase foreign borrowing, or increase government revenues, the last of which 
only amount to 13.5% of GDP. The fiscal space can then be used to increase spending on health, 
education and infrastructure. The authors show that it is difficult to discern between the three 
specified mechanisms, and that trade-offs are thus necessary at the national level. Furthermore, 
investment in infrastructure is not only beneficial for growth, but also for attainment of the 
MDGs. The structural constraints of the country should, however, be kept in mind, notably the 
fact that learning and the training of personnel takes time. 
4. Methodology 
For each of the simulations, an integrated macro-micro framework can be used to generate 
detailed results for a large range of indicators. The results of each of the simulations are 
compared to a reference, or “non-intervention,” scenario on the basis of historical trends and 
the available data. The following subsection presents the macroeconomic framework used, 
followed by the microeconomic analysis; we then present the different scenarios analyzed. 
4.1. Macroeconomic analysis 
The model for Burkina Faso was constructed using the standard PEP 1-t model (Decaluwé et al, 
2010). In order to account for country-specific characteristics as well as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) we have made the following modifications.  
4.1.1. Demand 
Household demand is a two-level nested function. The first level represents demand for each 
food product and the aggregate product that groups together all non-food commodities. 
Demand in this first level, represented by equations 1 and 2 below, is characterized by an AIDS-
type (Almost Ideal Demand System, (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980)) function. In the standard 
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PEP 1-t model, the demand function is characterized by an LES-type (Linear Expenditure System) 
function. We propose to use an AIDS-type function, which is much richer in that it allows us to 
better account for cross-price elasticities.7 Note that the set of price and income elasticities 
were estimated econometrically using the 2009 Integrated Survey on Burkinabe Household 
Living Conditions (EICVM) survey. 
Demand for the “non-food product” is then distributed among its components following a Cobb-
Douglas-type function (equation 3). Equation 4 determines the aggregate price of non-food 
products. Finally, equation 5 gives us a Stone price index. 
1. 





+++= ∑
tt
tC
iat
C
CNALIMia
iaj
tiaj
C
iajia
C
ia
t
tiatia
PIXSTOpop
CTH
PCNAPC
CTH
PCC
lnlnln ,,,
,, βγγα
 
2. 






+
++= ∑
tt
tC
CNALIM
t
C
CNALIMCNALIM
iaj
tiaj
C
iajCNALIM
C
CNALIM
t
tt
PIXSTOpop
CTH
PCNAPC
CTH
PCNACNA
ln
lnln ,,,
β
γγα
 
3. tt
CNA
inatinatina PCNACNACPC γ=,,  
4. ∏








=
ina
CNA
ina
tina
CNAt
CNA
inaPC
A
PCNA
γ
γ
,1  
5. t
t
tt
ia
tia
t
tiatia
t PCNACTH
CNAPCNA
PC
CTH
CPC
PIXSTO lnlnln ,
,, +








= ∑  
With: 
:,tiC  Household consumption of product i 
:tCNA  Household consumption of non-food products 
:tCTH  Household consumption budget 
:,tiPC  Consumption price of product i (including taxes and margins) 
:tPCNA  Price index of non-food products  
:tPIXSTO  Stone price index 
:CNAA  Cobb Douglas scale parameter – non-food products 
:Ciα  AIDS function parameter 
:Ciβ  AIDS function parameter 
                                                          
7 With an AIDS function, cross-price elasticities can be positive or negative. See Sadoulay and de Janvry 
(1995) for a detailed explanation of the use of different demand functions and specifically the properties 
of an AIDS function compared with an LES function. See as well Savard (2004) for an application of a of a 
AIDS function in a CGE. 
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:,
C
ijiγ  AIDS function parameter 
:CNAinaγ  Share of non-food products 
4.1.2. Debt and interest 
The model accounts for domestic and foreign debt and the related interest. Interest paid by the 
government on domestic debt is simply calculated as the product of the domestic interest rate 
and the debt stock (equation 6). Following the rules of national accounts, this interest appears 
as an income for households (equation 7). 
6. DOMtDOMDOMt DEBTirINT =  
7. DOMttttt INTYHTRYHKYHLYH +++=  
With: 
:DOMtDEBT   
Domestic (i.e., domestically held) public debt 
:DOMtINT  
 Interest on domestic public debt 
:DOMir  Interest rate on domestic public debt 
:tYH  Total household income 
:tYHK  Household capital income 
:tYHL  Household labour income 
:tYHTR  Household transfer income 
The government also has the option of taking on debt on foreign markets. It pays interest to the 
rest of the world, calculated in the same manner as for domestic interest. This interest is a 
source of income for the rest of the world. 
8. ROWtROWROWt DEBTirINT =  
9. ROWt
agd
tagdROW
j
tjtj
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ROW
m
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With: 
:ROWtDEBT   Public foreign (i.e., foreign held) debt 
:te   Nominal exchange rate 
:,tmIM  Quantity imported of product m  
:ROWtINT   Interest on public foreign debt 
:ROWir  Interest rate on public foreign debt 
:,tjKD  Demand for capital by sector j 
:,tmPWM  World price of imported product m (in currency) 
:,, tagjagTR  Transfers from agent agj to agent ag 
:tYROW  Income of the  rest of world 
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:RKagλ  Share of capital remuneration received by agent ag 
Government savings is thus calculated as the balance of government revenues and transfers to 
other agents, current public spending on goods and services, public investment and domestic 
and international interest paid to various agents. 
10. ROWtDOMtPUBtt
agng
tGVTagngtt INTINTITGTRYGSG −−−−−= ∑ ,,  
With: 
:tG  Current public spending on goods and services 
:PUBtIT  Public investment 
:tSG  Government savings 
:tYG  Total government revenues 
The change in the level of debt from one period to another is calculated by subtracting the 
budget balance (equation 11). A positive balance thus reduces total debt, while if the 
government runs a deficit this adds to total debt. We assume that the domestic public debt-to-
GDP ratio is fixed, reflecting the government’s limited ability to borrow from domestic agents. 
Thus, all additional financing needs must be met through an increase in foreign debt. 
11. 11 −− −= t
TOT
t
TOT
t SGDEBTDEBT  
:TOTtDEBT  Total public debt 
4.1.3. The Millennium Development Goals 
To model the MDGs, we essentially follow the approach proposed by Lofgren et al (2006). 
Regarding education, we specify the behaviour of students at a given academic cycle. We model 
the seven following educational behaviours: 
- The primary entry rate, i.e., the share of children of age to enter primary school and 
who are actually registered (entree) 
- The promotion rate, i.e., the share of students who successfully finish a given year of 
a level of education (reussi). This rate covers both students who pass a non-terminal 
year in a cycle (reussi_ctn) and those who pass the final year of the academic cycle 
in question (reussi_grd) 
- The repetition rate, i.e., the share of students repeating a given year in an academic 
cycle (redouble) 
- The dropout rate, i.e., the share of students who drop out of school in a given year 
(abandon) 
- The transition rate, i.e., the share of students who, once they have completed an 
academic cycle, pursue further studies at a higher cycle (grd_sup) 
- The share of students who, once they have completed an academic cycle, enter the 
labour market (grd_fin) 
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All of these shares have been calibrated using data published in the annual report on education 
statistics.8 They are then determined endogenously within the model. 
Following the MAMS maquette, the primary entry rate, the promotion rate and the transition 
rate are determined by a logistic function. The edj indicator represents the two levels of 
education accounted for in the model. The first cycle of education (or level 1) includes the 
primary school as well as the first four years of secondary school. The second level of education 
(level 2) includes the three final years of secondary school as well as post-secondary education. 
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With: 
:lg,, tedjSHR   Share of student in level edj with behaviour lg (entree, reussi, grd_csup) 
:lg,,0 tedjSHR  Initial share of students in level edj with behaviour lg 
:lg,,
I
tedjSHR   Intermediary share of students in level edj with behaviour lg 
:lg,
ED
edjα  Parameter (logistic function – education) 
:lg,
ED
edjβ  Parameter (logistic function – education) 
:lg,
ED
edjγ  Parameter (logistic function – education) 
:lg,edjext  Maximum value that the indicator can take (logistic function – education) 
In the preceding expression, only I tedjSHR lg,, is endogenous, the other components of the 
expression being parameters. This intermediary variable makes it possible to account for factors 
which influence the modelled behaviour through a logistic function.  
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With: 
:tCPC  Real per capita consumption 
:0CPC  Real per capita consumption in base period 
:,tedjEDQ  Education quality index in level edj 
                                                          
8 For primary schooling: http://www.cns.bf/IMG/pdf/Annuaire_2009_2010_MEBA.pdf 
For secondary : http://www.messrs.gov.bf/SiteMessrs/statistiques/ANNUAIRE-2008-2009-
SECONDAIRE.pdf 
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:0edjEDQ  Education quality index in level edj in base period 
:,tjKD  Capital stock in sector j 
:0jKD  Capital stock in sector j in base period 
:INFtKD  
Infrastructure stock 
:INFOKD
 
Infrastructure stock in base period 
:,4 tMDGMDGVAL  Value of MDG4 indicator 
:0 4MDGMDGVAL  Value of MDG4 indicator in base period 
:,tedjPT  Production price in education sector 
:0 ,tedjPT  Production price in education sector in base period 
:tPIXCON   Consumer price index 
:0PIXCON   Consumer price index in base period 
:,tlW  Wage rate of type l workers 
:0lW  Wage rate of type l workers in base period 
 
As the above expression shows, the change in each of these three behaviours depends on the 
education quality index, the stock of capital in the respective education sectors, the 
infrastructure capital stock in the economy, the wage differential between skilled and unskilled 
workers, a health indicator represented by MDG4,9 the price of education and finally per capita 
consumption. The value of each of these arguments is determined endogenously within the 
model. Moreover, elasticities estimated econometrically in the microeconomic model are used 
to account for the impact of a change in these indicators on participation and pass rates. 
Thus, we assume that an improvement in the education quality index will, all else equal, 
positively impact the different behaviours regarding education. Similarly, it is reasonable to 
suppose that an increase in the capital stock in the education sectors (such as an increase in the 
number of schools) would favourably impact these three behaviours. This impact would be 
larger for a higher elasticity. 
The following equation defines the education quality index. It is calculated as the supply of 
services in the different levels of education divided by the number of students enrolled in the 
corresponding cycle. 
14. 
tedj
tedj
tedj NST
XST
EDQ
,
,
, =  
 
With: 
:,tedjNST
 
Total number of students in level of education edj 
:,tjXST  Aggregate production of sector j 
                                                          
9 Child mortality. 
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The level of infrastructural development also plays an important role, particularly in Africa. 
Investment in infrastructure, such as building roads, would also have a positive impact because 
it would reduce the distance or time required to go to school. 
The wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers is the fourth factor influencing 
student behaviour. It is easy to see, for example, that if wages are much higher for skilled 
workers than for unskilled workers, students will have an incentive to pursue their studies in 
order to become skilled and to enjoy a higher future wage. 
The fifth argument of the function, the child mortality rate, is actually a proxy for child health. A 
low child mortality rate thus acts as an indicator of good child health, a factor influencing the 
capacity of children to integrate, succeed and pursue his/her studies. 
The sixth argument is a proxy for the financial accessibility of education (school fees). While the 
Burkinabe government takes responsibility for a major share of children’s school fees, a 
remaining share is the responsibility of the household, and this share may be an obstacle for 
households of more modest means. Reducing the cost of education would therefore have a 
beneficial impact on the different behaviours linked to education. 
Finally, the last argument of this function is the per capita consumption, which illustrates the 
assumption that if the overall financial situation of the household improves, the education 
behaviours also improve. Real per capita consumption is calculated at constant prices, according 
to the following equation: 
15. 
H
t
i
tii
t POP
CPC
CPC
∑
=
,
0
 
With: 
:,tiC  Household consumption of product i 
:0iPC  Consumer price of product i (including taxes and margins) in base period 
:HtPOP  
Population 
 
The following equations determine the other educational behaviours. Some of them are 
determined as residuals. The share of students having completed a level of education and 
deciding to leave school to enter the labour market is thus determined as: 
16. tCSUPGRDedjtFINGRDedj SHRSHR ,_,,_, 1−=  
Similarly, the share of students completing the final year of a level of education evolves in 
proportion to the graduation rate of the level of study in question. 
 
17. 0
,
0
_,
,,
,_,
GRDedj
GRDREUSSIedj
tGRDedj
tGRDREUSSIedj
SHR
SHR
SHR
SHR
=  
Also, the share of students passing a non-terminal year of a level of study is determined as the 
difference between the overall pass rate and the graduation rate in the final year of the level of 
study: 
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18. tGRDREUSSIedjtREUSSIedjtCTNREUSSIedj SHRSHRSHR ,_,,,,_, −=  
Following the MAMS maquette, the share of students who do not pass and then repeat a year is 
proportional to its level in the initial period. 
19. ( ) ( )tREUSSIedjREUSSIedj
REDOUBLEedj
tREDOUBLEedj SHRSHR
SHR
SHR ,,0
,
0
,
,, 11
−
−
=  
We can determine the share of students who drop out as a residual. In effect, at the end of a 
given school year, a student may either pass the year (promotion rate), or fail. In the case of 
failing a year, he/she may either restart it (repetition rate) or drop out of school (dropout rate). 
The sum of these three rates should therefore be equal to 1. The dropout rate is calculated as a 
residual: 
20. tREDOUBLEedjtREUSSIedjtABANDONedj SHRSHRSHR ,,,,,, 1 −−=  
The number of new students registered in level 1 is calculated by multiplying the number of 
children of age to enter school by the entry rate. 
21. 
6
,,1,1
H
ttENTREEEDUC
N
tEDUC POPSHRNST =  
With: 
:,1
N
tEDUCNST  Number of new students in level 1 education 
:6HtPOP  Population of age to enter primary school 
 
As for the second level of study, the new students in year t are those who completed level 1 and 
who decided to continue their studies in the following level. In our study, the new students in 
level 2 are students who completed the first level of study and continued to the second. 
22. 1,_,11,_,11,1,2 −−− ⋅⋅= tCSUPGRDEDUCtGRDREUSSIEDUCtEDUCN tEDUC SHRSHRNSTNST  
:,2
N
tEDUCNST  Number of students in level 2 education 
The number of old students enrolled in a cycle in a given period is calculated by summing the 
number of students in the cycle in the previous year that either repeated a year or passed a 
non-terminal year within the level of study. 
23. ( )1,,1,_,1,, −−− += tREDOUBLEedjtCTNREUSSIedjtedjO tedj SHRSHRNSTNST  
With: 
:,
O
tedjNST  Old students enrolled in cycle edj 
Finally, the total number of students enrolled in a cycle is the sum of old and new students. 
24. N tedjO tedjtedj NSTNSTNST ,,, +=  
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Improving the quality of education induces more students to pursue their studies, with a 
positive impact on labour supply in the country. In effect, investing in education now would 
positively impact the supply of skilled workers tomorrow. Thus, the equations below, which 
describe the labour supply of skilled and unskilled workers, account for interactions with the 
education system. 
The supply of skilled workers in a given period is thus given as the number of skilled workers in 
the preceding period who did not retire, plus students who completed level 1 of schooling and 
left school to enter the labour market, and students in level 2 who drop out of school as well as 
those who completed level 2. 
25. 
( )
1,_,21,_,21,21,,21,2
1,_,11,_,11,11,, 1
−−−−−
−−−−
⋅⋅+⋅+
⋅⋅+−=
tFINGRDEDUCtGRDREUSSIEDUCtEDUCtABANDONEDUCtEDUC
tFINGRDEDUCtGRDREUSSIEDUCtEDUCtLQLQtLQ
SHRSHRNSTSHRNST
SHRSHRNSTLSretLS
 
With:10 
:,tlLS  Total supply of type l worker 
:lret  Retirement rate of type l worker 
 
The supply of unskilled workers is the sum of: unskilled workers in the previous period who did 
not retire, students in level 1 who dropped out of school before completing that level and 
children who have not entered primary school. 
26. 
( )
( ) 611,,1
1,,11,11,,
1
1
H
ttENTREEEDUC
tDROPEDUCtEDUCtLNQLNQtLNQ
POPSHR
SHRNSTLSretLS
−−
−−−
−+
⋅+−=
 
The following equation is used to calculate an indicator for MDG2, and measures the share of 
children of primary school age who are actually enrolled in primary school. 
27. 
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In Burkina Faso, primary school includes six years, starting with CP1 and continuing with CP2, 
CE1, CE2, CM1 and CM2. 
With: 
                                                          
10 See p.32 for the definition of the sets. 
16 
 
:,2 tmdgMDGVAL  Value of MDG2 indicator 
The model also accounts for two health-related objectives: maternal mortality (MDG4) and child 
mortality (MDG5). For these two indicators, we use a logistic function to describe the evolution 
of the values of these two mortality rates. 
28. ( ){ }0 2,222
2
2,2 exp1 mdgn
I
tmdgn
MDG
mdgn
MDG
mdgn
MDG
mdgnMDG
mdgntmdgn MDGVALMDGVAL
extMGDVAL
−++
+=
βγ
α
 
With: 
:,2
I
tmdgnMDGVAL  Intermediary value of MDG indicator 
:0 2mdgnMDGVAL  Value of MDG indicator in base period 
:2
MDG
mdgnext  Minimum value the health indicator can take 
:2
MDG
mdgnα  Parameter (logistic function – other millennium objectives)  
:2
MDG
mdgnβ  Parameter (logistic function – other millennium objectives) 
:2
MDG
mdgnγ  Parameter (logistic function – other millennium objectives) 
 
In the preceding expression, only the intermediary variable is endogenous. This variable is 
determined with the help of numerous arguments. It depends most heavily on per capita public 
health spending. An increase in public health spending would thus have a positive effect on 
reducing maternal and child mortality. The second argument of this function represents the 
level of qualification among the population. In effect, we know that a more educated population 
is more able to provide care for itself and to care for young children. The third argument is the 
value of MDG7, the percentage of the population with access to drinking water. This argument 
is not explicitly modelled: it is an exogenous variable. An increase in this rate would have a 
beneficial impact on maternal and child mortality. The final argument of this function is real per 
capita consumption, which in some form represents the wealth of households. 
29. 
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4.2. Description of the database 
4.2.1.  The SAM 
We constructed a SAM for the year 2009 using the input-output table of that year.11 While other 
SAMs have already been published for Burkina Faso, they do not include major changes in 
recent years. Growth in the mining sector has been substantial, particularly its exports. Also, we 
would like the data, particularly data linked to the public budget, to reflect the current situation 
of the economy. 
In addition to the input-output tables, further data was needed, either to complete the SAM or 
to disaggregate it as appropriate for the issues being studied. To do this, we used data published 
by the INSD, the IMF, budgetary data and the 2005 Burkina Faso SAM. 
The final SAM includes two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), one household, 24 products 
and 17 sectors. The products are grouped into two large categories: food products (maize; rice; 
millet, sorghum and other cereals; fruits, vegetables and tubers; oils, fats and sugar; condiments 
and salt; beef, chicken, fish, eggs and milk products; and beverages and coffee) and non-food 
products (forestry; extractive industries; cotton; electricity, gas and water; oil; other 
manufactured products; construction; trade; transportation services; postal and 
telecommunications services; financial services; other trade services; level 1 education services; 
level 2 education services; health and social services; and other public administration services). 
The sectors include both the private sector (crops; livestock; forestry; extractive industries; 
beverages, coffee and tobacco; electricity, gas and water; other manufacturing sectors; 
construction; trade; transportation services; postal and telecommunications services; financial 
services; and other trade services) and the public sector (level 1 public education services, level 
2 public education services; health and social services and other public administration services). 
4.2.2. Education data 
We separate the education system into two levels:  
• Level 1 education includes students in primary school and those in the first cycle of 
secondary. Students who complete the first level of secondary school are considered as 
skilled workers when they enter the labour market. However, students who do not 
manage to complete this level enter the labour market as unskilled workers. 
• Level 2 education includes students in the second level of secondary school and 
students enrolled in higher education. 
We have determined the participation and pass rates (covered above) for each level of 
education using the annual reports published by the appropriate ministries.12 These rates are 
then calculated endogenously in the model. 
                                                          
11 Automated Forecasting Instrument (IAP), Burkina Faso 
12  For primary: http://www.cns.bf/IMG/pdf/Annuaire_2009_2010_MEBA.pdf. For secondary: 
http://www.messrs.gov.bf/SiteMessrs/statistiques/ANNUAIRE-2008-2009-SECONDAIRE.pdf. For higher 
education: http://www.messrs.gov.bf/SiteMessrs/statistiques/ANNUAIRE-2008-2009-SUPERIEUR.pdf 
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4.2.3. The initial values of the Millennium Development Goals 
Some of the data in the model does not come from the SAM, and we must assign a value for the 
base period, in this case 2009. The total population of Burkina Faso in 2009 and the population 
growth rates are both taken from the Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections 
Section (from UNDESA) database for 2009-2033. As for the values relating to the MDGs, we take 
the values published in SCADD (2010). 
4.2.4. Values of other variables and parameters in the model 
The elasticities of the MDGs (see section on the description of the model) and those on 
household consumption were estimated econometrically using the EICVM 2009 survey (see 
Table 1) following the approaches presented in detail in section 2. For elasticities related to 
trade and in the production function, we have taken the values used by Balma et al (2011). 
Table 1: Estimated elasticities 
  
Primary school 
entry 
(see section 
2.1.2)  
Transition 
from 
level 1 to 
level 2 
(see 
section 
2.1.4) 
Promotion 
rate (see 
section 
2.1.3) 
Mortality 
(under 5 
years) 
(see 
section 
2.5) 
Wage differential 0 0.019 0.021 n.a. 
Educational and other infrastructures 0.664 0.256 0.652 n.a. 
Child health1 (major handicap) -0.022 -0.012 -0.011 n.a. 
Per capita consumption 0.192 0.042 0.022 -0.042 
Equation quality2 1.1 0.9 0.5 n.a. 
School fees -0.416 0.0 0.0 n.a. 
Access to improved sanitation n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.023 
Access to prenatal care n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.125 
Mother’s level of education (completed 
lvl 1 or higher) 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.014 
 Income elasticity    
Millet, sorghum, other cereals 1.073    
Maize 0.255    
Rice 1.270    
Beef, chicken, fish, eggs and milk 
products 1.120    
Oils, fats and sugar 0.932    
Fruits, vegetables and tubers 0.666    
Beverages and coffee 0.944    
Condiments and salt 0.276    
Non-food goods 1.218    
Note: 1 At the macro level, we use MDG4 to proxy child health. The micro model estimates the elasticity of 
child health using the “major handicap” variable; 2Elasticities from MAMS model. 
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4.3. Microeconomic analysis 
 
Figure 1: Schema followed for estimation in the micro component (for example, at time t=1) 
 
 
The above schema (figure 1) shows the procedure and the order followed in estimating the 
micro component of the model. The following methodological notes are presented in the same 
order. We begin with the analysis of the education sector, which also helps to define the new 
sample of skilled and unskilled individuals in time t=1,2,… As indicated in the schema, education 
in time t is assumed to be a function of consumption in time t-1. We then estimate the change 
in wage income in time t (we assume other sources of income are not affected by the simulated 
changes in education). After estimating the changes in income, we can predict the changes in 
real consumption in time t, which also depends on changes in consumer prices. The new vector 
of real consumption in time t ultimately influences child mortality and caloric consumption in 
time t. Finally, we use the new figures for the consumption vector and mortality in time t to 
estimate education in time t+1, which in turn determines the sample of skilled and unskilled 
workers in time t+1. 
Before going into more detail about the subcomponents of the micro analysis, it is important to 
mention the demographic assumptions: the sample in the base year (the year of the household 
survey used in this study) is assumed to be constant across time and simulation scenarios. In 
other words, the age of individuals is held constant, as is household structure. 
 
4.3.1. Education 
Base models and estimation coefficients 
The goal in this section is to estimate the behaviour of children with respect to entry into 
primary school, passing the first cycle of education, and the choice to enter the second cycle for 
Education=f(X, Consumptiont-1) 
ΔWageIncomet (estimated from samples of skilled 
and unskilled individuals after estimating 
Educationt=1) 
ΔConsumptiont = f(X, ΔWageIncomet, 
ΔOtherIncomet, ΔConsumerPricet) Educationt+1=f(X, Consumptiont, 
Mortalityt) 
ΔCaloriest = f(X, ΔConsumptiont) Mortalityt = f(X, ΔConsumptiont) 
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those who complete the first. Remember that the first cycle of education includes the primary 
school as well as the first four years of secondary school. The second cycle of education includes 
the three final years of secondary school as well as post-secondary education. 
These models provide us with coefficients and elasticities to pass on to the macro model and 
allow us to identify the determinants of different education-related results, such as those 
presented above, and to exactly predict which children will be affected by the fiscal and social 
policies modelled in this study. 
Entry to primary school 
The probability of entering primary school is estimated from a sample of children aged 6-8 years 
using a probit model. Even though the legal age for school entry is 7 years, we also include those 
aged 6 years (because the survey only provides this information in years, with no information on 
month of birth) and those aged 8 years (because it is common in Burkina Faso for a child to 
delay school entry by a year). Among these children, only those who did not attend primary 
school in the previous year are retained. 
( )i v i iprobit Xπ α β ε= + +   
With: 
( )i i iE Y Xπ =   
where Yi is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the child attended the first year of primary 
school in the survey year but not in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The vector Xi includes 
the V individual, household and community socioeconomic characteristics of child i. The 
explanatory variables introduced in this model specification are specific to the school entry 
model, and are: whether the child has a birth certificate, whether the child attended preschool, 
the number of children aged 6-8 (the age used to estimate primary school entry) in the same 
household, the distance between the primary school and the child’s residence and primary 
school fees. This last variable is introduced in order to estimate the price elasticity of demand 
(or better, of the average probability) to enter school and to provide important guidance to 
policy makers. They were constructed by taking the median value of school fees paid directly by 
households in each census zone. 
Other explanatory variables that are common to the three education models are: sex of child, 
age (and age squared), urban/rural residence, education level of household head as well as 
his/her age group and sex, real per capita household consumption and whether the child suffers 
from a major handicap. 
Completing the first cycle of education 
As above, the probability of completing the first cycle of education is estimated using a probit 
model. To carry out this analysis, we take a sample of children up to the age of 25 inclusive who 
completed the final year of the first cycle in the previous year. Even if the expected age to 
obtain a diploma (Brevet d’Étude du Premier Cycle, BEPC) is 17, we opted for a sample that 
includes a larger age group because few people reach this level in Burkina Faso and because 
here we are not specifically interested in the child’s age upon graduation. 
Yi is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the child’s highest completed the first cycle of 
education and is 0 otherwise, regardless of whether the child pursues further studies. In 
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addition to the explanatory variables included in all three of the education models, the variables 
which are specific to this model are distance to secondary school from where the child lives and 
the ratio between income earned by a skilled worker and that of an unskilled worker. This last 
variable was constructed using median values of skilled and unskilled workers in each census 
zone. 
Continuation to the second cycle of education 
The probability of continuing on to the second cycle is estimated with a probit model. To do this, 
we retained a sample of children aged 16-25 inclusive, with a CAP diploma or higher and who 
were not working. 
Yi is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the child attended class 2nde or higher and had 
obtained a CAP diploma or higher, and is 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are the same as 
in the model in the previous section. 
Simulations 
After estimating the coefficients, we replace the values for certain explanatory variables in the 
models presented in section 2.1.2 with their simulated values, and then predict the probability 
of entry into primary school. More specifically, real per capita consumption and school fees (this 
latter, for the entry model only) are replaced with the relevant (simulated) values. 
In order to determine the change in primary school entry, the sample here (children aged 6-8 
years) is then ordered with respect to the individual probability of entering primary school. We 
then use the predicted changes to assign a new status to the relevant children: for example, if 
the macro model predicts a 3% increase in the primary entry rate, we only change the variable 
Yi to a value of 1 for the 3% of children who did not go to school in the base year and who had 
the highest probability of entering school. 
The newly skilled individuals are either those who graduated from the first cycle and do not 
continue their studies or who complete or drop out of their studies at the second cycle of 
education. They are chosen randomly from the appropriate sample (respectively among people 
who graduate and those who continue on to the second level of education) using simulated 
changes in the macro model for both cases. In these two cases, we do not have enough 
observations to use an econometrically estimated behavioural model to determine who enters 
the labour market. 
4.3.2. Sources of income 
The following sources of income are used in the micro model. The predicted changes, as well as 
consumption prices, ultimately influence child welfare, whether in terms of monetary or caloric 
consumption or in terms of education and health. 
Wages 
The analysis of the changes in employment status in the wage sector (which accounts for just 
4.1% of workers) and of observed and potential wages is carried out on the sample of 
individuals aged 15-65 inclusive who work in the wage sector or who do not work at all. We thus 
assume that the other types of workers (self-employed workers, apprentices or domestic 
workers) are not eligible to work in the wage sector (otherwise stated, the model assumes 
intersectoral immobility). Two models are specified, one for each level of qualification (skilled or 
unskilled). 
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The equations used to estimate the wage rate in the skilled (q) and unskilled (nq) sectors are 
defined as follows: 
ln
ln
q
i q vq i i
nq
i nq vnq i i
w X
w X
α β ε
λ ϑ υ
= + +
= + +
  
Where ln qiw  and ln
nq
iw are the logarithms of wages earned by individual i, who is either skilled 
or unskilled, as defined in the section on education. The first regression is estimated on the 
sample of individuals defined at the beginning of this section and who are skilled, while the 
second is estimated on unskilled individuals. The vector Xi includes the following explanatory 
variables for individual i: sex of the individual, whether he/she is the household head, region of 
residence, age and age squared, and level of education and its square. 
These equations are estimated using a standard Heckman-type selection model. When wage 
rates in a specific sector are only observed if the individual works in this sector, a selection 
problem arises. This is more of an issue when the error term in the wage equation is correlated 
to the error term in the equation which predicts the probability that the individual works in a 
given sector. In the presence of selection bias, the ordinary least squares estimators of the 
constant and the explanatory variables are biased and not consistent. The Heckman procedure 
provides consistent estimators and can estimate the wage equation in a sector under the 
condition that the individual actually works in the sector. Using maximum likelihood techniques, 
we jointly estimate the wage equations and the probability of employment (or selection) for 
both skilled and unskilled workers. The employment probability equation is estimated using the 
following explanatory variables: marital status of the individual, age and age squared, sex, 
education level, region of residence and the number of children living with him/her. The marital 
status and the number of children are necessary instruments to correct for selection problems. 
We then predict the wage rate and the probability of employment in the two sectors for each 
individual in the retained sample. The changes simulated by the macro model are then 
integrated into the micro component. More specifically, the individuals are ordered by their 
probability of being employed in one of two sectors. If there is an increase (decline) in the 
employment rate, then individuals with a higher (lower) probability and who do not work (work) 
in the relevant sector become workers (non-workers). Clearly, the analyzed samples (skilled and 
unskilled) must be updated at the beginning of each simulation scenario by importing the 
predicted status changes from the primary school pass model. Then, the change in the wage 
rate is applied to observed wages (or predicted for individuals who for some reason or another 
did not report their income). Finally, the changes in the wage sector are calculated at the per 
capita and household levels. 
Self-employment 
The per capita changes in income among the self-employed13 (34.4% of workers) are derived by 
applying the changes in the sectoral value added from the macro model (net of changes in 
labour demand). The sectors were classified following the categories in the input-output table. 
The income of individuals working as caregivers, apprentices/interns or volunteers (respectively 
54.3%, 6.9 and 0.2% of workers) is assumed constant. 
                                                          
13 Among the self-employed, no response was given for income in about 40% of cases; these were 
replaced by estimated (region-specific) values using a Heckman selection model. 
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Auto-consumption of food commodities 
Finally, changes in the value of auto-consumption of food commodities are also accounted for in 
the calculation of real household income. Food auto-consumption is calculated using 
consumption prices and their simulated changes by category of food consumption (as identified 
in the consumption section). 
4.3.3. Consumption and poverty14 
General theoretical principles 
The objective of this section is to present the reference theoretical framework that we adopted 
to compare the welfare of households when there are numerous consumption options following 
changes in the prices of consumption goods. To achieve this goal, we fix a reference price 
system, pr, and we use the equivalent income concept as defined by King (1983). Specifically, let 
xc,h be exogenous nominal income (corrected, if necessary, by household size, differences in the 
needs of adults and children, and the economies of scale associated with intrahousehold 
consumption) for household h living in strata c and pc the price system they face. This price 
system is assumed to be fixed in each stratum but varies between strata. 
For a given budget constraint (pc, xc,h), the equivalent income is defined as the level of income 
that allows them to attain the same level of utility under the reference price system as they 
obtained with (pc, xc,h): 
,( , ) ( , )
r
c ch c hv x v e=p p   
where v(.) is the indirect utility function and pr is the reference price system. The indirect utility 
function can be re-written to obtain equivalent income as a function of original expenditures: 
, ,( , , )
r
c h c c he e x= p p  
where ec,h is the equivalent income of household h in strata c, facing price system pc, and with a 
nominal per capita (or per adult equivalent) income of xch. The equivalent income (ec,h) is the 
level of income which, at reference price system pr, provides the same level of utility as 
obtained with income level xc,h and price system pc. Given that ec,h is a precise monetary 
measure of the utility function, the properties of the equivalent income function may be derived 
from those of v(.). This implies that the function e(pr, pc, xc,h) is increasing with respect to pr and 
xc,h, decreasing with respect to pc, is concave and homogenous of degree one with respect to 
reference prices, and has continuous first and second derivatives in all its arguments. 
The calculated equivalent income depends on the choice of the reference price system. As 
emphasized by King (1983), many options are possible for pr. In this study, we opt to set prices 
at their level in the base year (which corresponds with the survey year of the 2009 EICVM), p0: 
0 0
,
1
1 Cr
k k c k
c
p p p
C =
= = ∑
  
where C is the total number of strata. 
                                                          
14 This section is largely drawn from Bibi, Cockburn, Coulibaly and Tiberti (2009). 
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The first use of the equivalent income function is to predict changes in individual welfare 
following simulations of fiscal and social policies proposed in this study. A natural measure of 
the value of a given change in pc and xc,h for an individual is the change in his/her equivalent 
income. For pr= p0, King (1983) shows that this measure of the change in welfare is given by the 
equivalent gain: 
0 1 1 0 0 0
, , ,( , , ) ( , , )c h c c h c c hEG e x e x= −p p p p  
The equivalent gain is the amount of money a household considers as equivalent to the impact 
in the change in its budget constraint from (pc0, xc,h0) to (pc1, xc,h1). 
In terms of poverty, we define ze as the minimum real income required per capita (or per adult 
equivalent) to escape poverty. In other words, ze is an equivalent poverty line given by: 
0 0 0( , , )e c cz e z= p p  
where zc0 is the poverty line specific to strata c and evaluated for price system pc0. 
It is common to express measures of poverty in terms of normalized poverty gaps, ghc, defined 
for an individual as 
0
,
,
( , , )
max ,0e c c hc h
e
z e x
g
z
 −
=   
 
p p
 
g = (g1 , g2, …, gh, …, xH; n1 , n2, …, nh, …, nH) is thus the vector of poverty gaps. 
An important class of poverty measures is the FGT class of indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 
1984), defined as: 
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where α can be considered as a measure of aversion to poverty, or to inequality among the 
poor: a larger value of α gives a higher weight to a loss of income experienced by a relatively 
poorer individual. The P0(x, ze) measure of poverty gives the incidence of poverty (the poverty 
rate), P1(x, ze) gives the average poverty gap (or the normalized poverty deficit) and P2(x, z) is 
often described as the severity of poverty. 
 
Approach to estimate real consumption: substitutability or non-substitutability 
between consumption goods 
In terms of the effect of changes in consumer prices on real household consumption (which 
reflects purchasing power), it is assumed that, in the reference situation (the survey year) and 
thus prior to the simulation scenarios presented in this study, each household h has exogenous 
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per capita (or per adult equivalent) nominal income of xc,h0 and faces price system pc0. Following 
changes in consumer prices, each household h may have the same nominal per capita (or per 
adult equivalent) income (xc,h1= xc,h0) but faces a new price system pc1. We seek to compare 
levels of consumption, and thus poverty, when households face different price systems. The 
literature offers us many ways to do this, depending on whether or not we account for 
substitutability between goods. 
If we do not account for substitutability, we can follow the approach which assumes that prices 
change uniformly across household types, regardless of their consumption habits or 
sociodemographic characteristics, and then construct a consumer price indicator. Alternatively, 
we can construct an indicator of the price index for each household by weighting the price index 
for each category of consumption by the budget share that the household allocated to this 
category. Finally, if we wish to follow an approach which is more based on microeconomic 
theory, we may use a price index constructed with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The following 
section aims to present a theoretical and empirical approach to estimate real consumption 
when accounting for substitutability between food and non-food goods. 
 
Approach based on microeconomic theory: Accounting for substitutability between 
goods 
Under this more suitable theoretical assumption (of substitutability), we go beyond the simple 
assumption that households respond to price changes with a proportional reduction in the 
quantities consumed of the affected goods (fixed budget shares). By estimating the overall 
household response, in terms of substitution between food and non-food goods, we obtain a 
more realistic measure of the impacts on poverty, allowing us to analyze the nutritional impacts 
in greater detail (see following sections). Better yet, it becomes possible to predict the changes 
in the household consumption basket following a change in prices. 
To make the estimates of demand behaviour as flexible and as consistent as possible with 
economic consumer theory, we estimate the following demand system: 
,
, , , , , ,
1
ln ln
K
c h
j c h j j k k c j j c h c j h
k c
x
w a b p c e D
z
µ ε
=
= + + + + +∑
 
With: 
, , ,
1 1 1 1
; 1; 0
J J J J
j k k j j j k j j
j j j j
b b a b c e
= = = =
= = = = =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
   
where wj,c,h is the budget share allocated to good j by household h living in strata c, pj,c is the 
price of this good in strata c, Dc,h is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics and zc is the 
poverty line in strata c. 
This equation is an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), as proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), in which budget shares are linear in bjk and ck. The estimation strategy follows Deaton 
(1997) and uses spatial price variations in Burkina Faso to estimate price (bjk) and income (ck) 
parameters. The model may also include explanatory variables explicitly linked to household 
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sociodemographic characteristics in order to predict the impact of price changes on households 
according to characteristics such as the number of children. 
Once the parameters of the demand equations have been estimated, it becomes possible to 
predict the changes in real income following any change in prices or nominal income resulting 
from fiscal and social policies such as those proposed in this study. This is done using the 
following equation (which results from the system of preferences described by the AIDS 
equations): 
,
,
ln ln ( )
ln ( ) ln ( )
( )
c h c
c h r r
c
x z
e b z
b
 −
= + 
 
p
p p
p  
where 
z(pc) is the subsistence cost of living (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), defined as 
0 , , , ,
1 1 1
1ln ( ) ln ln ln
2
K K K
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and may be approximated by the poverty line in strata c  
and b(p) is equal to 
( ) jcj
j
b p p=∏
 
Then, the own-price, cross and income elasticities are calculated as: 
• Own-price elasticity of good j (εj,j) is: 
,
, 1
j j
j j j
j
b
c
w
ε = − −
 
with jw  as the average budget share allocated to good j 
• Cross-price elasticity of good j (εj,j) with respect to changes in the price of good k (εj,k) is: 
,
,
j k j
j k k
j j
b c
w
w w
ε = −
 
• Elasticity of good j with respect to income (ηj) is:  
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4.3.4. Caloric poverty 
The caloric poverty indicator is the caloric adequacy ratio, where we assume that all household 
members have the same ratio (i.e., that all calories are equitably distributed among household 
members in proportion to the needs of each member). 
,
, *
i t
i t
CI
CAR
CR
=
 where CARi,t is the caloric adequacy ratio of individual i in time t, CIi,t are the calories consumed 
per day by individual i and CR* is the caloric requirements of the reference male adult (2450 kcal 
per day). The poverty line is therefore equal to 1. CIi,t is defined as: 
, , ,i t i j t k
j
CI Q K=∑
 
where Qi,j,t is the quantity consumed (adjusted by the caloric requirement of individual i) of good 
j by individual i in time t and Kj are the kcal of good j consumed. 
With the estimates of the coefficients of the demand system, it is then possible to estimate the 
new consumption vectors (which follow the changes in prices and nominal income). 
4.3.5. Child mortality 
In this section we estimate the under-5 child mortality rate (U5MR) and the elasticities to supply 
to the macro model. The models presented in this section are estimated using the sample of 
children under the age of 5. 
An initial and more detailed estimation was carried out with a Cox survival model using micro 
data from the 2003 Burkina Faso Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). This model specifies 
instantaneous risk of death (i.e. risk) as a function of time t they are exposed to the risk, as well 
as other explanatory variables, to estimate the proportional risk (represented by exp(βv) in the 
following expression). We estimate the function 
( )0 1( , ) ( ) exp Vi i i v ivt X t Xθ θ β== ∑  
where θi is the instantaneous risk of death of child i at instant t that the child faced (i.e., his/her 
exposure to risk) up to t. θ0(t) is the base risk, which is the same for all children. The V 
explanatory variables X identified in this specification are: the sex of the child, urban/rural 
residence and region of residence, whether the mother obtained a primary diploma or higher, 
whether the child is a twin, the average number of women in each geographical cluster 
receiving prenatal checkups during pregnancy (a variable which identifies the availability and 
accessibility of medical services for pregnant women), whether he/she lives in housing with 
access to an improved source of water, whether he/she lives in housing with access to 
electricity. 
Since the DHS does not provide information on household consumption/income, in order to 
estimate the income elasticity of the probability of death among children under the age of 3 
years, we produce a more parsimonious model which uses explanatory variables that are 
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included in both the DHS survey (which provides the information needed to calculate mortality) 
and the EICVM survey (which includes data on household consumption). Compared to the 
preceding model, we exclude the twin and prenatal care variables. The coefficients of this model 
are estimated using a logit model as we cannot use a Cox model because the information 
needed to determine the period of exposure to risk is not available in the EICVM data. Once the 
coefficients of the logit model have been estimated (using the DHS survey), we use them to 
estimate the probability of death among children under the age of 5 (using EICVM data). We 
then estimate the OLS coefficient of real per capita consumption on the probability of death 
and, finally, the elasticity of the probability of death with respect to per capita consumption. 
 
5. Simulation scenarios 
5.1. Reference scenario 
The reference scenario is constructed using IMF forecasts (see 
http://www.imf.org/external/french/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11226f.pdf). Between 2009 (the 
reference year in the model) and 2033 (the last year simulated in the model), we produce a 
scenario which accounts for IMF forecasts for specific indicators: increases in foreign demand 
for cotton and minerals, a reduced deficit-to-GDP ratio, an increase in direct taxes on 
households and firms, and constant public spending as a share of GDP. Introducing the forecast 
increase in exports and the targeted income from direct and indirect taxes allows our model to 
produce an evolution of GDP similar to the forecast in the IMF document. 
The IMF forecasts only cover up to 2015, so the reference scenario anticipates that the policies 
implemented by 2015 will be maintained in following periods. Also, the demand for various 
export products matches the population growth rate as of 2015, implying that the foreign 
demand will continue to grow but at a slower pace compared to the 2010-2015 period. All of 
these assumptions are maintained throughout the simulations and the results are then 
compared to the reference scenario. 
Finally, we used demographic forecasts produced by the United Nations.15 These anticipate a 
gradual decline in the rate of population growth from 3.0% in 2009 to 2.6% in 2033. 
5.2. Comparison of spending 
Three types of public spending are analyzed: 
- An increase in current education spending (Spending, in the tables and figures); 
- A school fees subsidy (Subsidy); and 
- A cash transfer to households with children aged 0-5 years (Transfer). 
The same total amount of money is injected into the economy in each of these three cases, 
making it easier to compare the three scenarios. It must be noted that the policy is temporary 
(10 years) in every case, and by 2020 the public policies return to their levels in the reference 
scenario. Table 1 below establishes the connection between these additional amounts and the 
variables in question. 
 
                                                          
15 UNDESA, 2010. 
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Table 2: Simulated interventions 
 
Spending 
(in % of education spending) 
Subsidy 
(CFA per student) 
Transfer 
(CFA per child 0-5 years) 
2010 25% 24 501 17 823 
2011 23% 23 982 17 463 
2012 21% 23 380 17 135 
2013 16% 18 954 14 026 
2014 15% 18 414 13 790 
2015 14% 17 867 13 568 
2016 11% 13 820 10 668 
2017 11% 13 340 10 498 
2018 5% 6 436 5 166 
2019 5% 6 208 5 085 
 
5.3. Comparison of financing mechanisms 
We compare three financing mechanisms for each of the spending scenarios: 
- Reduced subsidies (PSUB in the tables and figures). The products and sectors 
benefitting from a subsidy in the reference situation16 see their subsidy rates fall in 
order to cover the shortfall in the budget associated with the new policies. Under 
this financing mechanism, the deficit-to-GDP ratio remains at its reference level. In 
other words, this ratio declines by half between 2009 and 2015. 
- Higher collection rate of indirect taxes (COLL). In this case, increased government 
spending is financed by increasing the collection of various indirect taxes and, as in 
the preceding financing scenarios, the deficit-to-GDP ratio follows the expected 
trend relative to the reference scenario. 
- Extending the public deficit reduction over ten years rather than five (DEFICIT). In 
this case, the government interventions are not offset by any fiscal measures. The 
deficit thus grows relative to the reference scenario, and the government achieves 
its goal of reducing the deficit-to-GDP ratio by half over ten years, rather than the 
anticipated five years. 
6. Analysis of results 
6.1. Increase in public education spending 
We begin here with a discussion of the effects of this simulation on education, the economy and 
poverty without consideration of the financing mechanism. Qualitatively, the results essentially 
go in the same direction and can be explained by the same transmission channels. We close the 
analysis of this scenario by comparing financing mechanisms. 
6.1.1. Impact on education 
While the additional amount injected by the government is the same in each of the three 
scenarios, the transmission channel affecting school participation rates is different. For example, 
                                                          
16 Manufactured products, including: oil; electricity, gas and water; transportation; and 
telecommunications. 
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in the Spending scenario, the government improves the education quality index, i.e., the volume 
of services supplied per student at each level of study. An increase in education spending leads 
to an increase in the supply of education services: with a constant number of students, the 
education quality index would improve (Figure 1).17 In our model, the education quality index is 
one of the factors influencing school participation rates. An increase in this indicator thus leads 
to an increase in the primary school entry rate (Figure 2) and a reduction in the dropout rate 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Education quality index, first level of study (2009 = 100) 
 
 
Figure 3: Entry rate, primary school 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Recall that the education quality indicator is measured as the ratio of the volume of services and the 
number of students.  
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Figure 4: Dropout rate, first level of study 
  
 
The combined effects of higher entry and lower dropout rates effectively increase the number 
of students going to school and thus improve the primary school net enrolment ratio18 (Figure 
4). This improvement was in the range of nearly 5 percent during the period of increased 
spending. 
Figure 5: Primary school net enrolment ratio 
 
Similar impacts are observed at the second level of study. The improvement in the education 
quality index also encourages students who graduate from the first level of study to continue 
their studies at the next level. The number of students thus increases in each of these levels of 
education, but this increase is even stronger in the second level, where the number of students 
substantially exceeds that observed in the reference scenario (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Here, this includes children aged 6-11 years who attend school. 
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Figure 6: Indicator of number of students per level (reference = 100) 
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6.1.2. Macroeconomic impact 
Employment 
The increase in the school participation rate has a positive impact on the supply of skilled 
workers. Recall that a worker is considered as skilled if he/she has successfully completed the 
first level of secondary school. The promising results presented above thus indicate growth in 
the supply of skilled workers, as shown in Figure 6. The increase is more than 2% higher than in 
the reference scenario. The small decline observed during the first two years can be attributed 
to an increase in the number of students continuing school beyond the first level of secondary. 
After this, and even by the end of the simulation period, the number of skilled workers remains 
higher than in the reference period. 
Figure 7: Supply of skilled workers indicator (reference = 100)  
 
In absolute terms, there would be nearly 50 000 new skilled workers. It is interesting to highlight 
that, since the number of students pursuing their studies in level 2 increases, the composition of 
skilled workers would include more workers who studied at the secondary level and somewhat 
fewer workers with only the first level diploma (Figure 7). The total supply of skilled workers 
thus increases, as does the level of education.  
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Figure 8: Number of new skilled workers by education level 
 
Growth  
The impacts of an increase in education spending on GDP and economic growth are limited. On 
the one hand, it is useful to recall that the reference scenario forecasts a marked increase in 
exports, which significantly stimulates economic activity. On the other hand, these results are 
not surprising given that it is assumed that responsibility for the financing mechanisms is taken 
on by the economy of Burkina Faso. In other words, there is reallocation within the economy; 
financing via foreign aid would have been shown to generate important impacts on growth.19 
Figure 9: Real GDP index (reference = 100) 
 
The impact on real GDP varies over the course of the period of analysis. For example, we 
observe a slight reduction in real GDP during the period of increased spending, due to the fact 
that students pursue their studies for longer and thus join the labour market less quickly. 
                                                          
19 This is notably the case in the study of Gottschalk et al (2009). 
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However, once their studies are completed, these new workers will be able to contribute to 
growth in national production (Figure 8). 
Consumption 
The reference scenario, as we presented above, forecasts economic growth to be higher than 
population growth. It is therefore unsurprising to observe an increase in real per capita 
consumption throughout the period of analysis. An increase in public education spending has 
little effect on real per capita consumption (Figure 9).20 In fact, only the scenario with increased 
public spending via a deficit shows an improvement for the years when the shock is introduced. 
The other financing mechanisms (reduced subsidies and improved tax collection) inevitably lead 
to an increase in consumption prices with the result that individual purchasing power basically 
remains the same. We discuss the financing mechanisms in greater detail in section 6.1.4. 
Figure 10: Real per capita consumption index (2009 = 100) 
  
Taxation 
Figure 10 presents the evolution of the government’s income-, deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios 
relative to the reference scenario. From a fiscal perspective, financing the increased spending 
does not impact the deficit-to-GDP ratio if this spending is financed by reducing subsidies or by 
improving tax collection These lines are superimposed in this figure. An increase in income 
compensates for new spending (dotted line). Debt thus does not change significantly as a share 
of GDP if one or the other of these mechanisms is used to finance the increased spending. 
However, if the spending is financed by a temporary increase in the deficit, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio increases to nearly 1.6 times its level in the reference scenario. In the longer term, it is thus 
unsurprising that debt as a share of GDP is slightly higher than it would have been. 
  
                                                          
20 Note that real per capita income progresses similarly. 
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Figure 11: Fiscal ratios (reference = 1) 
  
6.1.3. Impact on poverty 
The simulation results from the computable general equilibrium model – particularly those 
related to wage rates, employment of skilled and unskilled workers, production and 
consumption prices, and sectoral value added – are introduced in a microsimulation model of 
household and individual behaviour to forecast the impacts on child monetary and caloric 
poverty. It is important to highlight that the equivalence scales used in this study (adult 
equivalent according to caloric needs) differ from those used in the official estimates. This 
having been said, the estimates presented below are not comparable with the official number. 
The caloric and monetary poverty lines were determined in terms of the needs of children aged 
0-17. This explains why the child poverty rates are lower than poverty when using the lines set 
for the population as a whole. 
Given the reference scenario discussed above, and more specifically the evolution of real per 
capita consumption (Figure 9), it is not surprising that the incidence and depth of poverty 
(respectively P0 and P1) decline for both caloric and monetary poverty throughout the period of 
analysis (Figure 11). 
Figure 12: Evolution of poverty indicators in the reference scenario 
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In the long run, the incidence of child monetary poverty declines by nearly two-thirds, from 
28.6% in 2009 to 9.3% in 2030 (Figure 11); the poverty gap declines from 7.8 to 2.1% over this 
same timeframe.  
The poverty indicators expressed in caloric terms also improve, but by less: whereas nearly one 
in ten children can be expected to suffer from monetary poverty in 2030, nearly one in four will 
still suffer from caloric poverty. This can be explained by the differing impacts on the prices of 
food commodities, which increase by more than prices of other consumer products. 
Similarly, the poverty gap declines by less when considering caloric rather than monetary 
poverty. In 2009, an average increase in the equivalent caloric intake of nearly one-quarter of 
the caloric poverty line would have eliminated caloric poverty (P1). The required increase is one-
third lower in 2030. 
The increase in public education spending has little impact on these long term trends. In effect, 
in 2030 the indicators are fairly close to what they would have been in the absence of any 
government intervention, particularly when expressed in caloric terms (Figure 12). 
However, during the intervention period (i.e. over 2010-2015), monetary poverty indicators 
deteriorate when increased public spending is financed by a reduction in subsidies or improved 
tax collection. In fact, these two measures have the effect of increasing consumption prices, 
which explains why the incidence and gap of poverty are higher than their level in the reference 
scenario. 
Since taxes and subsidies are less oriented toward food products, these become relatively less 
expensive than other consumption goods. Households thus substitute away from non-food 
goods, which become more expensive relative to other goods. The situation with respect to 
caloric poverty thus improves in the first year of the simulation (2010) regardless of the 
financing mechanism. Recall that spending particularly grows in the early years of the 
simulation, and that this increase gradually diminishes in time (Table 1). The impact on caloric 
poverty is thus more pronounced in this first year and is lower thereafter.  
Figure 13: Variation (in percentage points) of poverty indicators with respect to reference scenario 
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6.1.4. Comparison of financing mechanisms 
The impact of an increase in public education spending is qualitatively similar, regardless of the 
financing mechanism. Compared to the reference scenario, the school participation and pass 
rates improve, the supply of skilled labour increases and economic activity is stimulated. 
Financing this new spending by reducing existing subsidies, however, leads to slightly higher 
levels of each of these indicators; the effect is similar, although smaller, when improved tax 
collection finances the spending. As discussed above, both of these financing mechanisms raise 
the overall price level. Since the price of education is not affected by these two mechanisms, 
neither reduced subsidies nor increased tax collection have a direct impact on education: the 
impact is thus felt through a relative change in prices, where the real price of education in the 
consumer’s deflated basket declines, thus promoting school participation and pass rates, along 
with the ensuing macroeconomic effects. 
The opposite is observed in terms of the impacts on poverty. Only financing the additional 
spending through an increase in the deficit reduces poverty rates significantly in the medium 
term. In the longer term, monetary poverty falls regardless of the financing mechanisms used, 
and the reduction is greater in both cases other than the increased deficit. These differences are 
barely perceptible for caloric poverty. 
These results were observed for all intervention types. In the following analysis, we solely focus 
on comparison of the three intervention types under one single financing mechanism, namely 
the deficit. The reader should nevertheless keep in mind the slightly differentiated impacted of 
the other financing mechanisms. 
6.2. Comparison of intervention types 
6.2.1. Impact on education 
The simulated interventions, while equivalent in terms of public spending, act differently on the 
factors influencing school participation and pass rates, as shown in the following three figures. 
Here, we see an increase in education spending improving the education quality index (Figure 
13), a school fees subsidy reducing the relative price of education (Table 14), while the transfer 
to households essentially promotes real per capita consumption (Table 15). Each of these 
elements has differing impacts on student behaviour, as reflected by different elasticities. 
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Figure 14 : Education quality index, first level of study (2009 = 100) 
 
Figure 15: Relative price of education index (2009 = 1) 
 
 
Figure 16: Real per capita consumption index (2009 = 100)  
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A reduction in school fees is shown to improve the primary school entry rate, but has less of an 
impact on the dropout rate, the transition rate and the graduation rate. So, subsidizing school 
fees causes more six-year-old children to join the education system. Since public spending on 
education is constant in this scenario, the higher number of students has the effect of reducing 
the quantity of education services received by each student (Table 13). The education quality 
index has the largest impact on pass rates, so the dropout rate is higher in this scenario (Table 
17). The primary school net enrolment ratio is thus somewhat lower than in the spending 
scenario, and this improvement is essentially due to an increase in the number of students 
entering primary school (Table 18). Moreover, the transition rate between the two levels of 
education is mainly affected by the education quality index. A higher dropout rate and a lower 
transition rate have the effect of reducing the number of students in the second level (Table 19). 
By increasing household purchasing power, transfers to households promote growth in real per 
capita consumption. While this is a determinant explaining educational behaviour, this factor 
has a smaller impact on education decisions, as reflected by a lower elasticity. The different 
indicators are thus essentially the same as in the reference scenario. 
Figure 17: Entry rate, primary school 
 
Figure 18: Dropout rate, first level of study 
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Figure 19: Primary school net enrolment ratio 
 
Figure 20: Number of students per cycle index (reference = 100) 
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6.2.2. Impact on labour market and growth 
Given the impacts on educational behaviours, it is not surprising to find that the supply of skilled 
workers is less stimulated in the subsidy and cash transfer scenarios than in the spending 
scenario. In fact, a school fees subsidy increases the number of skilled workers by just 3 000, and 
workers would be less educated because fewer of them pursue studies beyond the first level. A 
cash transfer to households, for its part, has a negligible impact on the number of skilled 
workers (less than 400 new workers) and has little impact on their level of education. As a 
result, the impacts on growth are barely perceptible. 
Figure 21: Supply of qualified workers index (reference = 100) 
 
Figure 22: Number of skilled workers by education level 
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Figure 23: Real GDP index (reference = 100) 
 
All of the scenarios have a similar impact on the deficit-to-GDP ratio; it increases during the 
period of increased spending and then returns to near its reference values. The deficit-to-GDP 
ratio is slightly higher than it would have been in the reference scenario after the period of 
increased spending, while the opposite is observed in the other interventions. Incidentally, the 
school fees subsidy and transfers to households both have greater impacts on the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the long term. This result can also be explained by increased economic activity in the 
long term in the education spending scenario (Figure 22), which increases the denominator of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. In other words, in the subsidy and cash transfer scenarios, the numerator 
(debt) is higher and the denominator (GDP) is lower than those in the spending scenario. 
Figure 24: Evolution of fiscal ratios (reference = 1) 
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three fewer children in a hundred living under the poverty line and five fewer children in a 
hundred suffering from caloric poverty. These values decline with the level of the transfer, and 
are almost negligible in the long term. The poverty gap progresses similarly: there is a large 
reduction in the poverty gap during the period of cash transfers with a gradual return to the 
reference values in the long run. 
All of these results can be explained by higher income among households with children, which 
clearly increases their purchasing power. Given that poor households have on average more 
children, this type of policy would tend to benefit them more than the other two policies. The 
other intervention types have a smaller and more indirect impact on household consumption, as 
shown in Figure 15. Compared to the spending scenario, the school fees subsidy opens up a 
share of the household consumption budget for the purchase of other products, which explains 
why the results concerning poverty are better. However, cash transfers still have the greatest 
impact on poverty. 
Figure 25: Variation (in percentage points) of poverty indicators with respect to reference 
scenario 
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7. Conclusion 
Despite high growth rates in recent years, Burkina Faso remains a poor country. The 
government recognizes the need for a stronger commitment to achieve the millennium 
development goals, particularly to reduce poverty. 
 
At the same time, the Burkinabe budget deficit has risen in recent years, in response to the 
various crises which have hit the country. There are strong pressures to rapidly reduce this 
budget deficit, but there are active concerns about how this will be achieved. 
It is in this challenging budgetary context that policymakers are struggling to find economic 
policies that would ensure improved living conditions for its inhabitants, most especially for its 
children. 
We modelled three public spending policies: (i) an increase in education spending, (ii) a school 
fees subsidy and (iii) a cash transfer to households with children under the age of five. The 
amount injected into the economy is the same in each of these three cases, making it easy to 
compare the three scenarios. We identified the three most realistic financing mechanisms: (i) an 
increase in subsidies, (ii) an increase in the indirect tax collection rate and (iii) an extension of 
the time to reduce the public deficit to ten years rather than five. 
We used a dynamic computable general equilibrium model together with a microeconomic 
model to evaluate the impacts of these three policies under three different financing 
mechanisms. Relative to the reference scenario, the results indicate that higher public education 
spending increases school participation and pass rates, leading to an increased supply and 
education level of skilled workers, all in turn leading to a lower incidence and depth of both 
monetary and caloric poverty. 
The school fees subsidies have more differentiated impacts on education, with a larger 
beneficial impact on primary school entry and a smaller impact on continuation of their studies. 
Finally, the supply of skilled workers increases slightly, but the education level of these workers 
is lower than in the reference scenario. This type of intervention thus also has a positive impact 
on poverty, and the impacts in this case are more pronounced than in the case of public 
education spending. 
As for the cash transfers, they have a minimal impact on educational behaviours, and thus on 
the supply of skilled workers, but they significantly reduce the incidence and severity of poverty. 
These results are qualitatively similar regardless of the financing approach. Moreover, the 
financing mechanism does not appear to have a significant impact on macroeconomic and fiscal 
indicators in the long term, particularly in the case of public education spending. For the other 
intervention types, the debt-to-GDP ratio would be higher than in the reference scenario. This 
having been said, financing the state interventions through a reduction in subsidies or improved 
tax collection would have negative impacts on poverty, because these measures increase the 
price level. 
In summary, if the objective is to achieve improved educational and economic performance, it 
seems as though the best approach to the intervention would be to increase public education 
spending. However, cash transfers to families would be more suitable if reducing child poverty is 
instead prioritized. Regardless of the intervention(s) ultimately adopted, the most suitable 
Spending 
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financing mechanism appears to be a temporary increase in the public deficit since this 
generates smaller negative impacts on the quality of life of the most destitute. 
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A1.5 Prices 
A1.5.1 Production 
76. tjtjtjtjtjtj CIPCIVAPVAXSTPP ,,,,,, +=  
77. ( ) tjtjttjtj PPtsipajsubttipPT ,,,, 1 ++=  
78. ∑=
i
tjititjtj DIPCCIPCI ,,,,,  
79. tjtjtjtjtjtj KDRTILDCWCVAPVA ,,,,,, +=  
80. ( )tjltltjl ttiwWWTI ,,,,, 1+=  
81. ( )tjtjtj ttikRRTI ,,, 1+=  
A1.5.2 International trade 
82. ∑=
i
tijtijtjtj XSPXSTPT ,,,,,,  
83. txjtxtxjtxtxjtxj DSPLEXPEXSP ,,,,,,,,,, +=  
84. tnxtnx PLP ,, =  
85. ( ) FOBtxtxtx PEttixPE ,,, 1 =+  
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86. ( ) 
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




+++= ∑ titij
ij
iijttitti PLPCtmrgNTItticajtiPD ,,,,, 1  
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95. ∏ 





=
i i
ti
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GVT
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PCO
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PIXGVT
γ
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96. t
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t
tiatia
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CNAPCNA
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PIXSTO lnlnln ,
,, +
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

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


=∑  
A1.6 Equilibrium 
97. tititititititi VSTKMRGNDITINVCGCQ ,,,,,,, +++++=  
98. tl
j
tjl LSLD ,,, =∑  
99. tk
j
tjk KSKD ,,, =∑  
100. PUBtttttt ITSROWSGSFSHIT ++++=  
101. ∑−−=
i
titi
PUB
tt
PRI
t VSTKPCITITIT ,,  
102. ti
j
tij DDDS ,,, =∑  
103. tx
j
txj EXDEX ,,, =∑  
A1.7 Gross domestic product 
104. tt
j
tjtj
BP
t SIPTTIPTVAPVAGDP ++=∑ ,,  
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105. t
BP
t
MP
t TPRCTSGDPGDP +=  
106. tt
j
tjtj
jl
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t TPRCTSTPRODNKDRLDWGDP +++= ∑∑ ,,
,
,,,  
107. [ ] ∑∑∑ −++++=
m
tmtmt
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i
tititititi
FD
t IMPWMeEXPEVSTKINVCGCPCGDP ,,,,,,,,, *  
A1.8 Dynamic equations 
108. 
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113. ( )tbusPRIttbus IRPKU += δ,  
114. ( )tbpubPUBttpub IRPKU += δ,  
A1.9 Millennium Development Goals 
115. 
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119. tCSUPGRDedjtFINGRDedj SHRSHR ,_,,_, 1−=  
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A1.10 Others 
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A1.10 Equations defined in the loop 
The variables in this subsection are fixed in the first period. 
134. 11 −− −= t
TOT
t
TOT
t SGDEBTDEBT  
135. ( ) 1,1,, 1 −− +−= tjjtjtj INDKDKD δ  
136. ( ) INFtjINFINFtjINFtj INDKDKD 1,1,, 1 −− +−= δ  
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137. ( )1,,1,_,1,, −−− += tREDOUBLEedjtCTNREUSSIedjtedjO tedj SHRSHRNSTNST  
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A2. Sets 
A2.1 Sectors and products 
All sectors: 






=∈
publservhealtheduceducothserfintelec
transporttradeconstrothmanwaterebevtobextrsyllivestockcrops
Jjjj
,,2,1,,,
,,,,,lg,,,,,
,
 
Public sectors: { }publservhealtheduceducJPUBpub ,,2,1=⊂∈  
Education sectors: { }2,1 educeducJPUBedj =⊂∈  
Private sectors:
Ø;
,
,,,,,
,lg,,,,,
=∩










=⊂∈ PUBBUS
othserfin
telectransporttradeconstrothman
waterebevtobextrsyllivestockcrops
JBUSbus  
All products plus an artificial one for non-food products: 










=∈
lim,,,2,1,
,,,,,,,,lg,cot
,,,,,,,,
,
cnapublservhealtheduceducothser
fintelectransporttradeconstrothmanpetrolwatereon
extrsylbevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegricemaize
ITOTitotjitot
 
All products: 
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









=∈
lim,,,2,1,
,,,,,,,,lg,cot
,,,,,,,,
,
cnapublservhealtheduceducothser
fintelectransporttradeconstrothmanpetrolwatereon
extrsylbevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegricemaize
ITOTiji
 
Products entering the household consumption function: 
{ }lim,,,,,,,,, cnabevtobmeatscondsaltoilfruvegmilsorgricemaizeITOTicmjicm =∈  
Food products: 
{ }bevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegmilsorgricemaizeIiajia ,,,,,,,, =∈
 
Non-food products: 






=∈
publservhealtheduceducothser
fintelectransporttradeconstrothmanpetrolwatereonextrsyl
Iinajina
,,2,1,
,,,,,,,,lg,cot,,
,
 
Imported products: 






=⊂∈
othserfintelectransportconstrothmanpetrolwatereon
extrsylbevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegmilsorgricemaize
IMm
,,,,,,,lg,cot
,,,,,,,,,
 
Non-imported products: 
{ } Ø;,,2,1, =∩=⊂∈ MNMpublservhealtheduceductradeINMnm  
Exported products: 






=⊂∈
publservothserfintelectransportothmanon
extrbevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegmilsorg
IXx
,,,,,,cot
,,,,,,
 
Non-exported products: 
 Ø;
2,1,,,,lg,,,
=∩






=⊂∈ XNX
health
educeductradeconstrpetrolwateresylricemaize
INXnx
 
Education: { }2,1 educeducINMedi =⊂∈  
All products other than education: 










=⊂
publservhealthothser
fintelectransporttradeconstrothmanpetrolwatereon
extrsylbevtobmeatscondsaltoilsfruvegmilsorgricemaize
Inedi
,,
,,,,,,,,lg,cot
,,,,,,,,,
 
A2.2 Production factors 
Categories of workers: { }LnqLqLl ,=∈  
A2.3 Agents 
All agents: { } { }RDMGVTfirmHHROWGVTFHAGagjag ,,,,, =∪∪=∈  
Non-governmental agents: { } { }RDMfirmHHROWFHAGAGNGagng ,,=∪∪=⊂∈  
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Domestic agents: { } { }gvtfirmHHGVTFHAGAGDagd ,,=∪∪=⊂∈  
A2.4 Students’ behaviours 
Behaviour of students: 
{ }highergradgradpassctnpassdropoutrepeatentrySBsbjsb _,_,_,,,, =∈
 
Behaviour of students characterized by a logistic function: 
{ }nextlvlgrdpassentrySBj _,,lglg, =∈
 
A2.5 MDG 
Millennium development goal indicators: { }7,5,4,2, mdgmdgmdgmdgMDGmdgjmdg =∈
 
Millennium development goals (logistic function): { }5,42,2 mdgmdgMDGjmdgnmdgn =∈
 
A2.6 Periods 
Periods: { }20332009−=∈Tt  
A3. Variables 
A3.1 Variables in volumes 
:,tiC  Household consumption of product i 
:,tiCG  Public consumption of product i  
:,tjCI  Total intermediate consumption of sector j 
:tCNA  Household consumption of non-food products (aggregate) 
:,tiDD  Total domestic demand for product i 
:,, tjiDI  Intermediate consumption of product i by sector j  
:,tiDIT  Total intermediate demand for product i 
:,ijDS  Internal supply of product i by sector j  
:,, txjEX  Quantity of product x exported by sector j  
:,txEXD  World demand for exported product x  
:0,txEXD  
Initial world demand for exported product x  
:,tmIM  Quantity of product m imported  
:,tjIND  Volume of new capital invested in sector j 
:INFtIND  Volume of new capital invested in infrastructure 
:,tiINV  Final demand for product i for investment (GFCF)  
:,
PRI
tiINV
 
Final demand for product i for investment (private) 
:,
PUB
tiINV  Final demand for product i for investment (public) 
:,tjKD  Demand for capital by sector j 
:INFtKD  Infrastructure stock 
:tKS  Total supply of capital  
:,, tjlLD  Sector j demand for worker type l 
57 
 
:,tjLDC  Sector j aggregate labour demand 
:,tlLS  Total supply of type l workers 
:,tiMRGN
 
Demand for product i (margins) 
:,tedjNST  Total number of students in level edj 
:,
N
tedjNST  Number of new students in level edj 
:,
O
tedjNST  Number of previous students in level edj 
:HtPOP
  
Population 
:6HtPOP   Population of age to enter education system 
:,tiQ  Quantity demanded of product i  
:,tjVA  Value added of sector j 
:,tiVSTK  
Changes in stock of product i 
:,, tijXS  Production of product i by sector j  
:,tjXST  Aggregate production of sector j 
A3.2 Price variables 
:te  Nominal exchange rate 
:tIR  Interest rate 
:,, tijP  Baseline production price of product i in sector j 
:,tiPC  Consumer prices of product i (including taxes and margins) 
:,tjPCI  Price index of intermediate consumption in sector j 
:tPCNA  Price index of non-food products 
:,tiPD  Price of product i sold on domestic market (including taxes and margins) 
:,txPE  Price received for export of product x (excluding export taxes) 
:,
FOB
txPE  FOB price of exported product x (in local currency)  
:tPIXCON  
Price index of household consumption  
:tPIXGDP   GDP deflator 
:tPIXGVT   Price index of public consumption 
:PRItPIXINV  
Price index of private investment 
:PUBtPIXINV  
Price index of public investment 
:tPIXSTO  Stone price index 
:PRItPK  Price of new private capital 
:PUBtPK  Price of new public capital 
:,tiPL  Price of product i sold in domestic market (excluding taxes on products) 
:,tmPM  Price of imported product m (including taxes and tariffs) 
:,tjPP  Price of total production of sector j  
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:,tjPT  Base price of total production in sector j 
:,tjPVA  Price of value added of sector j 
:,tmPWM  World price of imported product m (in currency) 
:,txPWX  World price of exported product x (in currency) 
:,tjR  Capital remuneration rate in sector j 
:,tjRTI  Capital remuneration rate in sector j (including taxes) 
:,tjU  Cost of using capital in sector j 
:,tlW  Remuneration rate of worker type l 
:,tjWC  Price index of aggregate labour 
:,, tjlWTI  Remuneration rate of worker type l (including taxes) 
A3.3 Nominal variables 
:tCAB  Current account balance 
:tCPC  Real per capita consumption 
:tCTH  Household consumption budget 
:DOMtDEBT  Domestic public debt 
:ROWtDEBT   Foreign public debt 
:TOTtDEBT   Total public debt 
:tG  Current public expenditures on goods and services 
:BPtGDP  GDP at base prices 
:FDtGDP  GDP at market prices (final demand) 
:IBtGDP  GDP at market prices (income) 
:MPtGDP  GDP at market prices 
:tGFCF  Gross fixed capital formation 
:DOMINT  Interest on domestic public debt 
:ROWINT  Interest on foreign public debt 
:tIT  Total investment 
:PRItIT  Private investment 
:PUBtIT  Public investment 
:tSF  Firm savings  
:tSG  Government savings 
:tSH  Household savings 
:tSROW  Rest of world savings 
:,tjSIP  Public production subsidy in sector j  
:tSIPT  Total public production subsidies  
:tTDF  Taxes on firm income  
:tTDH  Taxes on household income 
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:,tiTIC  Public receipts from indirect taxes on product i 
:tTICT  Total public receipts from indirect taxes 
:,tjTIK  Public receipts from taxes on capital in sector j 
:tTIKT  Total public receipts from taxes on capital 
:,tmTIM  Public receipts from customs tariffs on product m 
:tTIMT  Total public receipts from customs tariffs 
:,tjTIP  Public receipts from production taxes in sector j 
:tTIPT  Total public receipts from production taxes 
:,, tjlTIW  Public receipts from payroll taxes of worker type l in sector j 
:tTIWT  Total public receipts from payroll taxes 
:,txTIX  Public receipts from export taxes on product x 
:tTIXT  Total public receipts from export taxes 
:tTPRCTS  
Public receipts from taxes on products 
:tTPRODN   Public receipts from production taxes 
:,, tagjagTR   Transfer from agj to agent ag 
:tYDF  Firm disposable income 
:tYDH  Household disposable income 
:tYF  Firm total income 
:tYFK  Firm capital income 
:tYFTR  Firm transfer income 
:tYG  Total government income 
:tYGK  Government capital income 
:tYGTR  Government transfers income 
:tYH  Total household income 
:tYHK  Household capital income 
:tYHL  Household labour income 
:tYHTR  Household transfer income 
:tYROW  Rest of world income 
A4. Initial rates and intercepts 
:,tajsub  Adjustment variable via subsidies 
:,tajti  Adjustment variable via indirect taxes 
:edjtEDQ  Education quality indicator at level edj 
:,tmdgMDGVAL Value of MDG indicator 
:,2
I
tmdgnMDGVAL Intermediary value of MDG indicator 
:tNTD  New direct tax rate to reach IMG objectives 
:tNTI  New indirect tax rate to attain the IMF objectives 
:SGtR  Deficit-to-GDP ratio 
:TDtR  Direct tax-to-GDP ratio 
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:TItR  Indirect tax-to-GDP ratio 
:0 ,tsh  Initial intercept (household savings) 
:1sh  Slope (household savings) 
:,, tsbedjSHR  Share of students in level edj with behaviour sb 
:,,
I
tsbedjSHR  Intermediary share of students in level edj with behaviour sb 
:0 ttr  Initial intercept (transfers from households to government) 
:1tr  Marginal transfer rate from households to government 
:0 tttdf  Initial intercept (taxes on firm income) 
:1tttdf  Marginal tax rate on firms 
:0 tttdh  Initial intercept (taxes on household income) 
:1tttdh  Marginal tax rate on households 
:,tittic  Tax rate on product i 
:,tjttik  Tax rate on capital in sector j 
:,tmttim  Customs tax rate on import of product m 
:,tjtsip  Subsidy rate to production in sector j 
:,tjttip  Tax rate on production in sector j 
:,, tjlttiw  Tax rate on payroll of workers in sector j 
:,txttix  Tax rate on exports of product x 
A5. Parameters 
:, jiaij  Input-output coefficient 
:Citotα  AIDS parameter 
:lg,
ED
edjα  Parameter (education logistic function) 
:MDGmdgα  Parameter (other MDG logistic function) 
:CNAA  Scale parameter, Cobb-Douglas non-food products 
:_ PRIKA  Scale parameter (private investment function) 
:_ PUBKA  Scale parameter (public investment function) 
:LDjB  Scale parameter (CES – aggregate labour) 
:MmB  Scale parameter (CES – composite product) 
:VAjB  Scale parameter (CES – value added) 
:,
X
xjB  Scale parameter (CET – world and domestic market) 
:XTjB  Scale parameter (CET – total output) 
:Citotβ  AIDS parameter 
:lg,
ED
edjβ  Parameter (education logistic function) 
:,
LD
jlβ  Distributive parameter (CES – aggregate labour) 
:Mmβ  Distributive parameter (CES – composite product) 
:MDGmdgβ  Parameter (other MDG logistic function) 
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:VAjβ  Distributive parameter (CES – value added) 
:,
X
xjβ  Distributive parameter (CET – world and domestic market) 
:,
XT
ijβ  Distributive parameter (CET – total output) 
:jδ  Capital depreciation rate in sector j 
:INFδ  Infrastructure depreciation rate 
:η  Price elasticity of transfers and indexed parameters 
:lg,edjext  Extreme value (education logistic function) 
:MDGmdgext  Extreme value (other MDG logistic function) 
:,
C
itotjitotγ  AIDS parameter 
:CNAinaγ  Share of non-food products 
:lg,
ED
edjγ  Parameter (education logistic function) 
:GVTiγ  Share of product i in current public consumption 
:INVPRIiγ  Share of product i in total private investment 
:INVPUBiγ  Share of product i in total public investment 
:MDGmdgγ  Parameter (other MDG logistic function) 
:jio  Coefficient (Leontief – intermediate consumption) 
:DOMir  Interest rate on domestic public debt 
:ROWir  Interest rate on foreign public debt 
:RKagλ  Share of capital remuneration received by agent ag 
:,
TR
agjagλ  Distributive parameter (function for transfers between agents) 
:1n  Population growth rate in the first period 
:edjny  Number of years in level edj 
:jφ  Scale parameter (investment allocated per sector) 
:tpop  Population index 
:lret  Retirement rate for type l workers 
:LDjρ  Elasticity parameter (CES – aggregate labour)  
:Mmρ  Elasticity parameter (CES –composite product)  
:VAjρ  Elasticity parameter (CES – value added)  
:,
X
xjρ  Elasticity parameter (CET – world and domestic market) 
:XTjρ  Elasticity parameter (CET – total output) 
:lg
CHσ  Elasticity – per capita consumption (education intermediary function) 
:2CHmdgσ  Elasticity – per capita consumption (other MDG intermediary function) 
:lg
EDQσ  Elasticity – education indicator (education intermediary function) 
:EDUmdgσ  Elasticity – primary participation elasticity (other MDG intermediary function) 
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:HLTmdgσ  Elasticity – health indicator (other MDG intermediary function) 
:lg
KDσ  Elasticity – infrastructure (education intermediary function) 
:INFjσ  Elasticity – productivity and infrastructure 
:INVjσ  Elasticity (investment demand) 
:LDjσ  Elasticity (CES – aggregate labour) 
:Mmσ  Elasticity (CES – composite product) 
:4lg
MDGσ  Elasticity – MDG4 (education intermediary function) 
:lg
PTσ  Elasticity – school fees (education intermediary function) 
:VAjσ  Elasticity (CES – value added) 
:WATmdgσ  Elasticity – access to water index (other MDG intermediary function) 
:lg
WPσ  Elasticity – skilled/unskilled wage ratio (education intermediary function) 
:,
X
xjσ  Elasticity (CET – world and domestic market) 
:XDxσ  Elasticity – price of world demand for product x 
:XTjσ  Elasticity (CET – total output) 
:,ijitmrg  Margin rate i applied to product ij 
:jv   Coefficient (Leontief – value added) 
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